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16 CASA DUSE, LLC v. MERKIN
The creation of art is not a democratic process and in the very tyranny of 
its defined vision lies its value to the nation.1
 The film industry is one of the most lucrative divisions of the media and 
entertainment industry.2 Its popularity invites competition, and studios only move 
forward with projects that have a high likelihood of being “bankable.”3 How can 
studios predict the success of a film? One method is “high concept,” a formulaic 
approach to creating a widely profitable film.4 This formula consists of any or all of 
the following: a well-known director; a clear and easy to recite plot; connected 
commercial products, such as existing theatre, books, or music; a single-image, which 
captures the heart of the film; and ancillary merchandise.5 An acclaimed director can 
significantly tip the scales in favor of a film’s success. When the name attached to a 
project is Steven Spielberg, for example—known for his creative directorial 
contributions to iconic films like Jaws, E.T., and Saving Private Ryan, which transcend 
nominal achievement—studios are inclined to move forward with the project.6
 The Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) provides copyright protection to original 
works of authorship, such as motion pictures.7 The purpose of the Act is to incentivize 
the creation and dissemination of original works; it therefore awards protection to 
authors of original expressions.8 This case comment contends that the Second Circuit 
erred in utilizing the dominant author test, thus awarding exclusive copyright 
protection to the party who executed the majority of the billing and contractual 
1. The Berne Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & 
Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 503 (1988) (testimony of Steven Spielberg on 
behalf of the Directors Guild of America). In 1988, acclaimed director Steven Spielberg left his project, 
Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, to testify in favor of legislation granting moral rights to artists. 
Peter Decherney, Hollywood’s Copyright Wars 146–47 (2012). Spielberg’s testimony supported 
the auteur movement within the entertainment industry to solidify directors’ rights and protections as 
the authors of their films. Id.
2. Andrea DaSilva et al., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 2016 Top Markets Report Media and 
Entertainment: A Market Assessment Tool for U.S. Exporters 71–72 (2016).
3. See Al Lieberman with Patricia Esgate, The Entertainment Marketing Revolution 45–46 
(2002).
4. Id. at 46. But see William Goldman, Adventures in the Screen Trade 39 (1983) (“Nobody knows 
anything.  .  .  . Not one person in the entire motion picture field knows for a certainty what’s going to 
work. Every time out it’s a guess—and, if you’re lucky, an educated one.”).
5. Lieberman with Esgate, supra note 3, at 46–47.
6. See id.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2012). “Motion pictures” are defined as “audiovisual works consisting of a series 
of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any.” Id. § 101.
8. The Act seeks to create an economic incentive to create and disseminate original works of authorship by 
providing protection and maintaining a market for those works in order to fulfill the larger, constitutional 
goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). “To this end, copyright assures authors 
the right to their original expression . . . .” Id. at 349–50.
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agreements, which circumvents the purpose of the Act.9 Had the court emphasized 
the filmmaking process and the parties’ degree of creative input, the Second Circuit 
would have awarded the director a copyright in his work. The court’s decision 
effectively devalued the director’s contributions and disregarded the purpose of the 
Act, leaving the creative party empty-handed.
 The plaintiff, 16 Casa Duse, a film production company, solicited the services of 
the defendant, Alex Merkin, to direct Casa Duse’s new screenplay, Heads Up.10 
Before production began, Robert Krakovski, owner and operator of Casa Duse, sent 
Merkin a “Director Employment Agreement” to sign.11 The agreement provided 
that Casa Duse would retain all rights in the film.12 Despite several reminders from 
Krakovski, Merkin never signed the agreement.13
 Merkin completed his directorial duties during production—“advising and 
instructing the film’s cast and crew on matters ranging from camera angles and 
lighting to wardrobe and makeup to the actors’ dialogue and movement.”14 After 
filming concluded, Krakovski delivered a hard drive containing the raw film footage 
to Merkin for editing.15 The parties entered into a “Media Agreement,” which 
memorialized that Merkin “would edit but not license, sell, or copy the footage” 
without Casa Duse’s permission during editing.16 Afterward, Krakovski proposed 
changes to the agreement, stipulating that Casa Duse owned the hard drive and 
footage therein, and that final directorial and editorial rights would be determined in 
a final work-for-hire agreement.17 Merkin agreed to some of the changes, but 
clarified that he would “not giv[e] up any creative or artistic rights” to the work.18 
Krakovski informed Merkin that Casa Duse had always intended to retain Merkin’s 
services on a work-for-hire basis.19
 After failed negotiations, Casa Duse demanded that Merkin return the raw 
footage of the film, but Merkin refused.20 Merkin claimed copyright ownership of the 
raw footage and forbade Casa Duse from using the footage without Merkin’s consent.21
9. See 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015).





15. Id. at 251–52.
16. Id. at 252.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citation omitted).
19. Id. A work made for hire does not vest ownership in the party who created the work, but rather considers 
“the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared . . . the author [and thus the owner] . . . 
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a [signed writing] . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
20. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 252.
21. Id. Merkin registered a copyright in the raw footage with the U.S. Copyright Office. Id.
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 Casa Duse sued for an injunction to prohibit Merkin from interfering with Casa 
Duse’s use of the film, which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York granted.22 Shortly thereafter, Casa Duse filed an amended complaint, seeking a 
judgment to declare Merkin’s copyright registration invalid.23 Merkin filed an amended 
answer, seeking a judgment to declare a director an “author,” thereby recognizing 
Merkin’s copyright interest.24 Both parties then moved for summary judgment.25 The 
district court ruled in favor of Casa Duse on all claims; Merkin appealed.26
 On this issue of first impression, the Second Circuit held that a contributor to a 
creative work, who is not a joint author, co-author, or party to a work-for-hire 
agreement, may not retain a copyright interest in non-de minimis27 contributions 
alone when those contributions are inseparable from and integrated into a work.28 
The court concluded that Merkin was not a joint author or co-author under the Act, 
since neither party “fully intended to be [a] co-author[].”29 Additionally, the court 
concluded that Merkin’s contributions were not a work made for hire because Merkin 
was not Casa Duse’s employee and the parties “failed to execute a written agreement.”30 
Therefore, the court was presented with two issues: (1) whether non-de minimis 
contributions that are inseparable from and integrated into the work in question are 
copyrightable; and (2) which party owned the copyright in the raw footage.31
22. Id. at 253.
23. Id. Casa Duse’s amended complaint also asserted claims for breach of contract, tortious interference with 
business relations, and conversion. Id. Upon review, the court determined that the district court 
improperly concluded that Merkin’s conduct constituted tortious interference under New York law 
because Casa Duse failed to establish the element that Merkin acted dishonestly or used wrongful means. 
Id. at 261–62. This case comment does not discuss the accuracy or merits of this portion of the decision.
24. Id. at 253.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 254.
27. It was undisputed by both parties that Merkin’s contributions were non-de minimis. See id. De minimis is 
short for de minimis non curat lex, which means “[t]he law does not concern itself with trif les.” De minimis 
non curat lex, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The de minimis inquiry in copyright is 
commonly seen in joint work analyses because an author’s contribution must be more than de minimis in 
order for her to be a co-author of a joint work. See Michael Landau, Joint Works Under United States 
Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation Through Statutory Misinterpretation, 54 IDEA 157, 167–68 (2014). 
The question whether a contribution is de minimis is a fact-specific inquiry. Id. at 168–72, 182–83. 
Compare Boggs v. Jaap, No. 87-829-N, 1988 WL 166535, at *5 (E.D. Va. July 20, 1988) (holding that 
the illustrator’s sketches and plot suggestions were de minimis contributions to a book), with Strauss v. 
Hearst Corp., No. 85 Civ. 10017 (CSH), 1988 WL 18932, at *1, *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988) 
(determining that sketching the layout of a photograph and providing the physical content of the 
photograph were non-de minimis contributions to the photograph itself). 
28. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 256.
29. Id. at 255–56 (quoting Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
30. Id. at 256.
31. See id. at 255–56.
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 To determine the issue of copyrightability for non-de minimis contributions, the 
court first turned to the Act.32 The court looked to the enumerated examples of 
copyrightable materials and concluded that the Act did not intend to protect 
individual contributions integrated into works—such as film direction or acting—
because all enumerated examples are complete works.33 The court noted that 
individual contributions do not fall within the definition of “ joint work” or “collective 
work.”34 Joint works require interdependent parts to be merged into a unitary whole, 
and collective works require “separate and independent” contributions assembled into 
a whole.35 Therefore, the court inferred that non-de minimis, inseparable contributions 
are not themselves works of authorship.36
 The court also relied on a House of Representatives report for the Act, which 
states, “a motion picture would normally be a joint rather than a collective work with 
respect to those authors who actually work on the film, although their usual status as 
employees for hire would keep the question of coownership from coming up.”37 The 
court inferred from this statement that individual, inseparable contributions to a film 
would not typically be copyrightable.38
 The Second Circuit was guided in part by policy concerns expressed in the Ninth 
Circuit decision Garcia v. Google, Inc.39 about potential ramifications of allowing any 
member of a collaborative process to carve out a copyright interest for her individual, 
inseparable contributions to a work.40 These concerns and the statutory interpretations 
discussed above led the Second Circuit to hold that Merkin could not own a copyright 
interest in his directorial contributions to the film.41
32. Id. at 256.
33. Id. at 256–57. The enumerated examples include motion pictures, literary works, and musical works, to 
which there are typically multiple contributors. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
34. See 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 257.
35. Id. The Act identifies three distinct ways in which multiple authors may create a work of authorship: 
joint works, works made for hire, and collective works. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Joint works are works 
prepared by multiple authors “with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” Id. Collective works require that contributions be “separate 
and independent” to acquire copyright protection. Id. See supra note 19, for the definition of a “work-
for-hire.”
36. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 257. A finding that a piece is not a work of authorship automatically excludes 
the piece from copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (requiring fixation and an original work of 
authorship for qualification as copyrightable subject matter).
37. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736; see 16 Casa Duse, 
791 F.3d at 257.
38. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 257.
39. 786 F.3d 733, 742–43 (9th Cir. 2015). In this Ninth Circuit case, an actress sought a copyright interest 
in her individual contributions to a film as a performer. Id. at 737–39. The Ninth Circuit denied the 
actress a copyright interest and explained that this decision was necessary to avoid “mak[ing] Swiss 
cheese of copyrights.” Id. at 742.
40. See 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 258–63.
41. Id. at 259.
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 To determine copyright ownership in the raw footage, the Second Circuit again 
began with the Act, which lays out ownership frameworks for joint works, works 
made for hire, and collective works.42 Because 16 Casa Duse fell outside the scope of 
these scenarios, the court declared that full copyright ownership belonged to the 
“dominant author” of the work.43 Without a “proffered rule” for determining which 
author is dominant, the court relied on “factual indicia of ownership and authorship,”44 
which included decisionmaking authority, the way in which parties bill and credit 
themselves, and the number of written agreements with third parties.45 The court 
extracted these factors from two Second Circuit cases46: Childress v. Taylor47 and 
Thomson v. Larson.48 Applying these factors, the court found that Casa Duse retained 
greater decisionmaking power and entered into more third-party agreements than 
Merkin did.49 Therefore, the court held that Casa Duse was the dominant author 
and the owner of the copyright interest in the raw footage.50
 This case comment contends that the Second Circuit erred in holding that 
Merkin’s non-de minimis directorial contributions were not copyrightable because it: 
(1) conflated the analysis for “copyrightability” with the analysis for joint works; (2) 
incorrectly applied a rigid, limitative interpretation of the Act; and (3) relied on 
distinguishable case law to support an illusory policy concern. The court failed to 
acknowledge case law and legislative materials asserting that non-de minimis 
contributions that are integrated into and inseparable from a work are copyrightable, 
and failed to consider another manner by which Merkin could obtain a copyright 
interest in the film. Furthermore, the court erred in denying Merkin copyright 
ownership in the raw footage because it: (1) improperly relied on the “dominant 
author” test, and (2) failed to consider the established definitions of “author.” The 
court’s conclusions undermine the purpose and necessity of work-for-hire agreements, 
and run contrary to the Act’s intent.51
42. Id. at 259–60.
43. Id. at 260.
44. Id. (quoting Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 945 F.2d 500, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1991) (assessing how the parties planned to bill and credit themselves to 
determine whether the parties intended to be co-authors).
48. 147 F.3d at 202–04 (assessing decisionmaking authority, how the parties planned to bill and credit 
themselves, and written agreements with third parties to determine whether the parties intended to be 
co-authors).
49. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 260–61.
50. Id. at 261.
51. This case comment does not contest the conclusion that the parties were not joint authors or that 
Merkin’s contributions were not a work made for hire. The court correctly concluded that the parties 
were not joint authors, because neither party “fully intended to be co-authors.” Id. at 255. The court also 
correctly concluded that Merkin’s contributions were not a work made for hire because the parties failed 
to enter into a written agreement. Id. at 256.
275
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 61 | 2016/17
 First, the Second Circuit erred by conflating the question of copyrightability 
with the question whether a work constitutes a joint or collective work.52 Copyrightable 
material is simply an “original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium.”53 
An analysis of copyrightability should follow strictly from this definition.54 The Act 
also identifies multiple ways two or more authors can create a work, which include 
joint works and collective works.55 The creation of a joint work depends on intent, 
and the creation of a collective work depends on the assembly of independent works.56 
Therefore, the presence of a joint or collective work depends on the manner by which 
multiple authors create the work, which is a separate and distinct analysis from 
whether the work in question is copyrightable.57 A finding of a joint or collective 
work does not presuppose that the work is copyrightable, and a copyrightable work is 
not necessarily a joint or collective work.58
 However, the Second Circuit relied on the definitions of “ joint work” and 
“collective work” to conclude that non-de minimis contributions are not works of 
authorship when they are integrated into and inseparable from the whole.59 The Act 
defines “ joint work” and “collective work” to instruct how copyright ownership 
should be divided in each scenario.60 It does not follow that multiple authors, who 
create a work together but whose contributions are distinct, are excluded or prevented 
from owning copyright interests in their individual contributions. Therefore, a 
finding that Merkin’s contribution did not constitute a joint work does not resolve 
whether Merkin was entitled to a copyright interest in the film. This issue can only 
be resolved with a copyrightability analysis.
 The court also erred by supporting its copyrightability conclusion with an over-
rigid, limitative interpretation of the Act. Copyright ownership vests in “original 
52. See id. at 256–58.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
54. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 
1227 (9th Cir. 2000). 
55. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
56. When multiple authors create a work, intending for each contribution to be merged into a “unitary 
whole,” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736, the Act 
memorializes that “[t]he authors of a joint work are coowners,” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). When multiple 
authors create and sequence separate and independent works, the author retains copyright ownership for 
her individual contribution, because “[c]opyright in each separate contribution  .  .  . is distinct from 
copyright in the collective work.” Id. § 201(c).
57. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232.
58. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “ joint work” and “collective work”), with id. § 102(a) (memorializing 
the requirements for copyrightability independently of the definitions and requirements of “ joint work” 
and “collective work”).
59. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 257 (2d Cir. 2015).
60. See supra note 56. Joint authors are awarded an undivided interest in the whole of the work, while 
authors of a collective work retain an individual copyright interest in their respective works. See 17 
U.S.C. § 201.
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works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”61 The Act does not 
define “works of authorship,” but provides that works of authorship include 
enumerated categories.62 The Act specifies that the term “include” is “illustrative and 
not limitative.”63 Furthermore, Congress purposefully provided examples of works of 
authorship as categories of works—or “class[es] or divisions[s] of . . . things regarded 
as having particular shared characteristics”64—rather than as one class of works with 
the same characteristic. Congress understood that providing an exhaustive list of 
every potential work of authorship would be time consuming, redundant, and 
arguably impossible; it therefore sought to draft an illustrative statute that would use 
categories to broaden the scope of works of authorship to provide “sufficient f lexibility 
to free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of ” limitative groupings.65
 Motion pictures are enumerated in the Act as a category of works of authorship.66 
It is well understood that motion pictures are “work[s] to which many contribute; 
however, those contributions ultimately merge to create a unitary whole.”67 The 
court’s conclusion that Merkin’s non-de minimis directorial contributions that are 
integrated into and inseparable from the motion picture are incapable of being works 
of authorship because they themselves do not constitute the entire motion picture, 
improperly limits works of authorship to the specific categories enumerated in the 
Act. This rigid reading of the Act is not only impractical, but also unintended by 
Congress and contrary to settled case law.
 Two Ninth Circuit decisions demonstrate when non-de minimis contributions 
that are integrated into and inseparable from a work can be copyrightable, and thus 
must constitute works of authorship.68 The Ninth Circuit took great care to 
distinguish between the analyses for joint works and copyrightable works while 
addressing this issue.69 In Aalmuhammed v. Lee, the court explained that joint works 
require that two or more authors contribute to a work, with the intent to be joint 
authors.70 However, there are some situations when an individual may contribute 
61. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 101.
64. Category, Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/category (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2017).
65. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6).
67. Richlin v. MGM Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 975 (9th Cir. 2008).
68. A finding of copyrightability requires that the protected work is a work of authorship. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a).
69. The Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that “authorship is required under the statutory definition of a joint 
work, and that authorship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution.” 
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 1231–32.
277
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 61 | 2016/17
copyrightable material to a work without being an author of that work.71 Therefore, 
the individual may be entitled to a copyright interest in the contribution without 
being an author of a joint work.72 For example, hairstylists, lighting designers, or 
casting directors may contribute copyrightable material to a film.73 But because they 
are not the “mastermind” behind the film, they are not, themselves, authors of the 
film.74 However, hairstylists, lighting designers, or casting directors still “may be 
deemed to be the ‘author’ of [their] expression for purposes of determining whether 
[their expression] is independently copyrightable.”75 Therefore, Aalmuhammed stands 
for the proposition that individual contributions that are integrated into a work may 
be independently copyrightable.
 In Effects Associates v. Cohen, the Ninth Circuit addressed a similar issue when it 
held that a special effects designer granted an implied license to a film producer to 
use the designer’s special effects in a film.76 This holding emanated from a discussion 
of implied licenses, but demonstrated the Ninth Circuit’s adherence to the view that 
individual, integrated contributions to a film, such as special effects, are subject to 
their own copyright protection.77 The court could not have reached the implied 
license conclusion without determining that the designer owned copyright in his 
special effects.78
 The Ninth Circuit has settled on the position that non-de minimis contributions 
that are inseparable from a film are subject to independent copyright protection and 
that works of authorship are not confined to entire motion pictures. The Second 
Circuit should have adopted the Ninth Circuit’s position and held that Merkin’s 
directorial contributions could be copyrightable.
 Congress and the Copyright Office also have recognized the copyrightability of 
individual contributions to works of authorship. For example, “musical works” is 
listed in the Act as a work of authorship category.79 The Act does not define musical 
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1232.
73. Id. at 1233.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1232.
76. 908 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1990). After the plaintiff created and delivered special effects footage for the 
defendant’s film, The Stuff, the defendant expressed dissatisfaction with the work product and proceeded 
to pay the plaintiff only half of the promised amount. Id. at 556. The plaintiff made several demands for 
the outstanding balance, and eventually brought a copyright infringement action, claiming the 
defendant had no right to use the footage until the balance was paid. Id. The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff granted the defendant an implied license to use the footage, and thus eliminated the cause of 
action for copyright infringement. Id. at 558.
77. See id. at 556.
78. See id. at 558. An implied license may only be granted by the owner of the copyrighted work. Id. at 556. 
In Effects Associates, “no one dispute[d] that Effects [was] the copyright owner of the special effects 
footage used.” Id. This finding set the foundation for the court’s analysis to determine if Effects 
Associates granted the defendant an implied license in the footage. See id. at 558.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
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works, but the Compendium III80 recognizes elements of musical works, including 
“melody, rhythm, harmony, and lyrics.”81 If separate applications are received for 
ownership of these elements, the Copyright Office will usually look to whether the 
applicants are co-authors.82 The Compendium III provides the following example to 
illustrate this scenario:
An applicant names Bill Bland as the author of lyrics and Terry Taylor as the 
author of music, and states, “Bill owns the lyrics and Terry owns the music.” 
The specialist will provide information about joint works, and if the lyrics 
and music are separately owned, will ask that they be registered on separate 
applications with separate deposits.83
Inclusion of this scenario illustrates the Compendium III ’s recognition that copyright 
protection is not limited to the categories provided in the Act and that protection 
may extend to individual contributions to a work, such as lyrics or music to a musical 
work. Under this methodology, individual contributions to all works of authorship, 
such as direction in a motion picture, are eligible for copyright protection as well.
 The closest question to whether a non-de minimis contribution that is integrated 
into and inseparable from a creative work is entitled to copyright protection arose in 
the Ninth Circuit decision Garcia v. Google, Inc., where an actress sought copyright 
protection for her individual contributions to a film as a performer.84 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected the actress’s particular claim and refused to grant her a copyright 
interest in her performance, expressing deep concern for the “legal morass” that 
would follow a decision in her favor.85 The Second Circuit allowed a similar concern 
to guide its analysis, but failed to acknowledge two crucial distinctions between the 
two cases.
 First, the actress “never fixed her acting performance in a tangible medium”—a 
critical element of copyrightable subject matter.86 Merkin, however, did fix his 
contribution in a tangible medium by recording the film.87 Second, the Garcia 
decision did not create a de facto rule against copyrighting individual contributions, 
80. The Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices is a publication issued by the U.S. Copyright Office 
that draws on the expertise of attorneys, registration specialists, and design experts to craft an 
explanatory guide for the intricacies of the Act. See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. 
Copyright Office Practices (3d ed. 2014). The Second Circuit has relied on this publication to 
discern the meaning of works of authorship under the Act. See Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 
157, 161 (2d Cir. 1986) (using the Compendium as persuasive authority to determine the meaning of 
choreographic works).
81. U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 80, § 802.3.
82. Id. § 802.8(C).
83. Id.
84. 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
85. Id. at 742.
86. Id. at 743.
87. See KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 719 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the fixation 
requirement is satisfied by any product of the photographic process, including film).
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it only declined to award copyright protection to one actress’s contributions. Third, a 
“legal morass” would not arise from allowing a director to copyright her individual 
contributions to a film, as it might from allowing an actress to copyright hers, 
because of the considerable disparity between a director’s role and that of an actress. 
 A director’s creative contributions to a film are widely regarded as more significant 
than those of an actor or actress. The directorial role is respected as the “main role” in 
film production88 because directors exert creative control over the project from the 
time they come on board until the project is complete.89 Part of the director’s creative 
control involves sculpting the performance of actors, which plainly demonstrates the 
superiority of the directorial role.90 Furthermore, a single person fulfills the role of a 
director, whereas the cast comprises multiple actors and actresses.91 Because of the 
significant difference between these roles, the Second Circuit’s analogy between 
Merkin’s contributions and those of the actress in Google v. Garcia was inappropriate, 
and concern for the “legal morass” that would result from granting a copyright interest 
in the directorial contributions to a film is unfounded.
 The Second Circuit’s analysis of whether non-de minimis contributions that are 
integrated into a work are subject to copyright protection was misguided because it 
relied on an analysis for joint works, an unduly limitative interpretation of the Act, 
and an illusory policy concern.92 These errors caused the Second Circuit to incorrectly 
88. Actors and actresses are omitted from the roles generally regarded as the “helmsmen” of the filmmaking 
process; these roles consist of the director, the producer, the head of production, and the screenwriter—
they are the ones who “cause a film to happen.” F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the 
Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 225, 282 (2001) (quoting 
Alexandra Brouwer & Thomas Lee Wright, Working in Hollywood 1 (1990)).
89. Direction, Film Reference, http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/Criticism-Ideology/Direction- 
RESPONSIBILITIES.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
90. The director has creative control over “creative aspects of a film, including coordinating the content and 
f low of the film’s plot; directing the performance of actresses and actors; organising and selecting the 
locations in which the film will be shot; [and] managing technical details.” Steve Esomba, Moving 
Cameras and Living Movies 40 (2013).
91. See id.
92. The Second Circuit also attempted to utilize the House of Representatives report on the Act to support 
the conclusion that individual, inseparable contributions to a work are not copyrightable. 16 Casa Duse, 
LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 257 (2d Cir. 2015). The report acknowledges that a motion picture would 
generally be deemed a “ joint rather than a collective work” on the basis of the authors’ roles in the 
filmmaking process. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5736. Regardless, the authors’ “usual status as employees for hire would keep the question of coownership 
from coming up.” Id. This statement only highlights Congress’s intent for work-for-hire agreements to 
remedy ownership disputes. It does not, however, stand for the Second Circuit’s proposition that authors 
lose a copyright interest in their work in the absence of a work-for-hire agreement. See Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (case remanded to determine alternative grounds for copyright 
protection after the defendant’s work was determined not to be a work made for hire). The report 
explicitly rejects this interpretation by acknowledging the possibility of an ownership dispute, which 
would only be possible if a copyright interest could exist without a work-for-hire agreement. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120. The Second Circuit’s misuse of this report demonstrates the gravity of its 
divergence from relevant authority when addressing the issue of non-de minimis contributions’ 
copyrightability.
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hold that Merkin’s contributions were not eligible for copyright protection.93 The 
court should have recognized that directorial contributions to a film can be 
copyrightable, and should have used the plain language of the Act to determine 
whether Merkin’s contributions were in fact copyrightable.
 The Supreme Court declared that subject matter requires two elements to be 
eligible for copyright protection: originality and fixation.94 Originality requires that 
the work “possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity.”95 An original work 
immediately acquires copyright protection when it is “fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression.”96 A work is “fixed” when its “embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated.”97 It cannot be disputed that Merkin possessed a minimal degree of 
creativity while fulfilling the directorial duties for the film.98 Furthermore, it cannot 
be disputed that a motion picture is fixed when it is recorded on a camera, especially 
when that footage is transferred to a hard drive.99
 In addition to the Second Circuit failing to recognize that Merkin’s individual 
contributions were copyrightable, the court also failed to consider another way that 
Merkin could have received a copyright interest in the film. The Act provides 
protection to derivative works. It defines “derivative work” as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a  .  .  . motion 
picture version,  .  .  . or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original 
work of authorship . . . .100
Protection for a derivative work “extends only to the material contributed by the 
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the 
work.”101 The definition of derivative works recognizes a “motion picture version,”102 
93. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 259.
94. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).
95. Id. at 345. The Supreme Court acknowledges that “[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark.” Id.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
97. Id. § 101.
98. The threshold for originality is a low standard and only “mandates some minimal degree of creativity.” 
Feist Publ ’ns, 499 U.S. at 362. Some elements of originality involved in capturing film, or a photograph, 
include “posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of f ilm and camera, evoking the desired 
expression, and almost any other variant involved.” Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). 
Merkin advised on and created some, if not all, of these elements. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 251, 260.
99. See KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 719 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the fixation 
requirement is satisfied by any product of the photographic process, including film).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
101. Id. § 103(b).
102. Id. § 101.
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which can include motion pictures based on a screenplay.103 This is the kind of work 
Merkin created in his role as director of the film. Merkin was presented with a 
screenplay and asked to direct a film.104 Within this role, Merkin “identified specific 
camera angles, lighting schemes, and focal points; directed the actors’ blocking, 
gestures, and delivery; and made concrete contributions to the set design and other 
visual elements of the Film.”105 Neither party contested that Merkin made 
copyrightable contributions through his role as a director.106 Therefore, even if the 
Second Circuit found that individual contributions that are integrated into and 
inseparable from the work are not subject to copyright protection, the court should 
have granted Merkin a copyright interest in the film as a derivative work.
 When addressing the issue of copyright ownership in the raw footage, the court 
improperly adopted and relied on the “dominant author” test, which looks to “factual 
indicia of ownership and authorship,” such as decisionmaking authority, written 
agreements with third parties, and how the parties plan to bill and credit themselves.107 
The court extracted these factors from Childress108 and Thomson;109 both of these 
cases, however, applied the dominant author test to determine the parties’ intent—
the “touchstone” element of joint works.110 Neither case utilized these factors to 
address the question of copyright ownership.111
 By relying on the dominant author test, the Second Circuit again confused the 
“ joint work” inquiry with the “copyrightable work” inquiry that the Aalmuhammed 
court warned against.112 This resulted in confusion; the Second Circuit contradicted 
103. See, e.g., Shoptalk, Ltd. v. Concorde-New Horizons Corp., 168 F.3d 586 (2d Cir. 1999).
104. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, No. 12 Civ. 3492(RJS), 2013 WL 5510770, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2013), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015).
105. Id. at *8.
106. Id.
107. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 260 (quoting Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998)).
108. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit’s sole issue in this case was whether 
Childress was the sole author or whether she and Taylor were joint authors. Id. at 508. The Act requires 
that both parties “inten[d] that their contributions be merged” to create a joint work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012). Because the intent of the parties was unclear, the Second Circuit assessed how the parties 
planned to bill and credit themselves to determine if they intended to be joint authors. Childress, 945 
F.2d at 508.
109. Thomson, 147 F.3d 195. When the requisite intent for joint works was unclear, the Second Circuit 
looked to the decisionmaking authority, how the parties planned to bill and credit themselves, and 
contractual agreements with third parties to determine intent. Id. at 202–04.
110. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
111. See Thomson, 147 F.3d 195; Childress, 945 F.2d 500. In Thomson, the Second Circuit even acknowledged 
that the question whether non-de minimis contributions that are integrated into and inseparable from the 
whole are subject to copyright protection has never been answered. See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 196. However, 
the court declined to pursue the issue, since the parties only contested a claim of joint authorship. Id.
112. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000). When the plaintiff claimed to be a joint 
author of the film Malcolm X, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of differentiating between 
determining joint authorship and determining what constitutes a joint work under the Act. Id.
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itself by relying on a test that determines whether the requisite intent for joint works 
is present after concluding that Merkin’s directorial contributions did not make him 
a joint author of the film.113 Misplaced reliance on this test led the court to ignore 
the plain text of the Act, where the answer to ownership lies.
 The Act vests ownership “in the author or authors of [a] work” of copyrightable 
subject matter.114 In other provisions, the Act provides guidelines for how ownership 
should be divided for joint works, collective works, and works made for hire. 
However, by vesting ownership “in [an] author or authors,” the Act indicates that 
Congress anticipated situations, like the one at hand, when more than one author 
created a work in a manner distinct from joint, collective, or work-made-for-hire 
scenarios. Otherwise, a general provision would be unnecessary and redundant.115 
Because the Second Circuit should have concluded that Merkin’s contributions 
constituted copyrightable subject matter, the sole issue in determining copyright 
ownership should have been whether or not Merkin was an author.
 Fortunately, the solution is simple, as the Second Circuit conceded that Merkin 
was an author.116 In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the Supreme Court 
issued what is now the accepted definition of authorship, stating, “[a]s a general rule, 
the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who 
translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression . . . .”117 Merkin’s job description as 
a director was exactly that: “advising and instructing the film’s cast and crew on 
matters ranging from camera angles and lighting to wardrobe and makeup to the 
actors’ dialogue and movement.”118 This description is consistent with the roles 
generally assigned to a director in the film industry,119 and upholds the well-accepted 
practice of treating the director of a film as the author.120 Merkin acted as an author 
113. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 259–60 (2d Cir. 2015).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
115. The canon against surplusage disfavors the reading of a statute that would give two or more clauses the 
same meaning because it is presumed that Congress did not intend an “enactment which renders 
superf luous another portion of that same law.” United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 
185 (2011) (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)).
116. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 259–60.
117. 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
118. 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 251.
119. See supra note 90.
120. Auteur theory places the “ultimate responsibility for a film’s artistic impact on the director. It is the 
director who combines the elements of the picture . . . to create a cohesive and unified whole.” Craig A. 
Wagner, Note, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
628, 636 (1989) (footnote omitted). The theory is based “on the notion that a director impresses his own 
inf luence and style on each of his films, and that this style is evident throughout the entire body of his 
work.” Id. (footnote omitted). This notion has been applied in copyright law, and courts have even 
awarded authorship to a director who did not physically capture the footage because the director’s 
impression and control over the artistic vision were so significant. See Lindsay v. Wrecked & Abandoned 
Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 92 Civ. 9248(HB), 1999 WL 816163, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) 
(holding that a director was the author of a film, even though he did not physically capture the imagery). 
In Lindsay, the director left detailed instructions to the crew, reviewed the footage at the conclusion of 
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when he translated the idea of the film into a motion picture and fixed it in a tangible 
medium. Therefore, Merkin should have been awarded copyright ownership in the 
raw footage.
 The resounding impact of the Second Circuit’s decision is twofold: it undermines 
the purpose of the Act and removes the need for work-for-hire agreements. The 
purpose of the Act is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”121 The 
Act accomplishes this by awarding protections to an author’s original expressions, 
and by allowing and encouraging others to further develop ideas and information 
expressed in existing works.122 Without these protections, many artists would not be 
able to invest significant time, labor, and resources into artistic endeavors because 
there would be a small likelihood of a financial return.123 Additionally, artists may 
not want to share or disseminate their personal work for fear of others appropriating 
and using it without limitation.124
 Merkin will certainly feel the impact of the Second Circuit’s decision, which 
leaves him empty-handed. Because the court failed to recognize Merkin’s 
contributions as copyrightable and failed to grant him ownership in the raw footage, 
Merkin received no protection or recognition for his work, and Casa Duse was 
permitted to use the film without limitation.125 This decision will not incentivize 
Merkin, as a director, to continue to create or share his films. Furthermore, Merkin—
and others in his position—will be skeptical of the benefits that come from creating 
a work of authorship if copyright protections continue to be determined by factors 
entirely distinct from the creative process, such as contracts with third parties.126
 One of the primary purposes of work-for-hire agreements is to provide certainty 
in copyright law by eliminating ownership disputes and questions of coownership.127 
Because the creator is presumed to be the owner,128 projects with multiple creators 
and contributors can cause confusion, which can result in conf lict regarding 
ownership. Work-for-hire agreements avoid this conflict by transferring all copyright 
ownership to the employer, or to the party who commissioned the creation.129 
each day to ensure it was consistent with his vision, and supervised the filming from another location. 
Id. at *5. The court found “he exercised such a high degree of control over [the] film operation . . . [that 
he] may be said to be an ‘author’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act.” Id.
121. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
122. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).
123. Lydia Pallas Loren & Joseph Scott Miller, Intellectual Property Law: 343–45 (Version 3.1 
2013) (ebook).
124. Id.
125. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 259, 261 (2d Cir. 2015).
126. See id. at 261.
127. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
128. When a person “contributes to a book or movie, . . . the exclusive rights of copyright ownership vest in 
the creator of the contribution, unless there is a written agreement to the contrary.” Effects Assocs., Inc. 
v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
284
16 CASA DUSE, LLC v. MERKIN
However, if other courts follow the Second Circuit’s methodology, work-for-hire 
agreements will cease to be necessary. Ownership disputes will be resolved by 
assessing indicia of ownership, and will vest copyright ownership in the dominant 
author.130 In the context of motion pictures, this would almost always result in the 
producer being the dominant author, as the person responsible for handling the film’s 
production decisions and third-party contracts.
 The Second Circuit’s decision contradicts both the Act’s plain language and its 
purpose by depriving the creative mastermind of copyright protection. Without a 
remedy for this error, the character of copyright ownership litigation will significantly 
change, and artists will not have incentives or rewards for creating new works. The 
Second Circuit’s decision sets forth a new “high concept” that will incentivize 
producers to make bankable films but will not incentivize artists to participate—
which is a surefire way to damage the integrity of the filmmaking industry.
130. See 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 260–61.
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